Girl in the cellar: a repeated cross-sectional investigation of belief in conspiracy theories about the kidnapping of Natascha Kampusch by Stefan Stieger et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 24 May 2013
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00297
Girl in the cellar: a repeated cross-sectional investigation
of belief in conspiracy theories about the kidnapping of
Natascha Kampusch
Stefan Stieger1, Nora Gumhalter 1, Ulrich S. Tran1, Martin Voracek1 and Viren Swami2,3*
1 Department of Basic Psychological Research and Research Methods, School of Psychology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
2 Department of Psychology, University of Westminster, London, UK
3 Department of Psychology, HELP University College, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Edited by:
Christopher C. French, Goldsmiths,
University of London, UK
Reviewed by:
Anna Newheiser, Yale University,
USA
Christopher T. Thresher-Andrews,
Goldsmiths, University of London,
UK
*Correspondence:
Viren Swami, Department of
Psychology, University of
Westminster, 309 Regent Street,
London W1B 2UW, UK.
e-mail: v.swami@westminster.ac.uk
The present study utilized a repeated cross-sectional survey design to examine belief
in conspiracy theories about the abduction of Natascha Kampusch. At two time points
(October 2009 and October 2011), participants drawn from independent cross-sections of
the Austrian population (Time Point 1, N = 281; Time Point 2, N = 277) completed a novel
measure of belief in conspiracy theories concerning the abduction of Kampusch, as well
as measures of general conspiracist ideation, self-esteem, paranormal and superstitious
beliefs, cognitive ability, and media exposure to the Kampusch case. Results indicated
that although belief in the Kampusch conspiracy theory declined between testing periods,
the effect size of the difference was small. In addition, belief in the Kampusch conspiracy
theory was significantly predicted by general conspiracist ideation at both time points.
The need to conduct further longitudinal tests of conspiracist ideation is emphasized in
conclusion.
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Conspiracy theories refer to explanations of important events,
such as war, natural disasters, and poverty, which include “appeals
to the intentional deception and manipulation of those involved
in, affected by, or witnessing these events” (Basham, 2003, p. 91).
Typically, these deceptions are believed to involve multiple actors
working together toward some malevolent end (Barkun, 2003;
Bale, 2007; Swami and Furnham, 2013). In this sense, conspir-
acy theorizing can be said to adopt “a counter-discourse of some
sort” (Gray, 2010, p. 29); that is, conspiracy theories present a
stance that is counter-hegemonic and that is opposed to ortho-
dox, official, or received explanations of an event (Buenting and
Taylor, 2010; Swami and Coles, 2010).
Traditionally, academic investigations have tended to view
conspiracy theorizing as the result of pathology, both on the
grounds of morality and rationality (e.g., Hofstadter, 1966;
Donskis, 1998; Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2013). Such per-
spectives include the implicit suggestion that conspiracist ideation
fosters dysfunctionality and, therefore, stunts any form of agency
on the part of conspiracist actors (e.g., Quimby, 1993; Thomas
and Quinn, 1993). More recently, however, a growing body of
work has argued that such a lens of psychopathology is defi-
cient (Swami and Coles, 2010; Swami and Furnham, 2013), as
it fails to recognize the way in which ordinary actors use con-
spiracy theories to construct complex arguments in relation to
intergroup relations and to challenge political, ideological, and
social hegemony (Sapountzis and Condor, 2013).
Based on this perspective, a growing body of work has focused
on individual difference traits that may predispose some individ-
uals to endorse conspiracy theories. An important outcome of
this work is the suggestion that conspiracy theories form part
of a “monological belief system,” in which the adoption of a
conspiracist worldview eases the assimilation of new conspiracy
theories (Goertzel, 1994). Certainly, there is growing evidence to
suggest that a stronger conspiracist worldview is associated with
greater belief in specific and newly-emerging conspiracy theories
(Swami et al., 2010, 2011), more conspiracist explanations for a
given event (Swami and Furnham, 2012), and even adoption of
contradictory explanations for the same event (Wood et al., 2012).
In tandem with this research, a small body of work has focused
on the individual difference variables that are associated with
conspiracist ideation. Thus, the available evidence suggests that
stronger belief in conspiracy theories is associated with lower
self-esteem, feelings of powerlessness and anomie, political cyn-
icism and distrust, greater support for democratic principles,
greater openness to experience, and stronger New Age beliefs
(e.g., Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2012,
2013; Darwin et al., 2011; Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami, 2012;
Swami and Furnham, 2012; Jolley and Douglas, 2013). There is
also some evidence that conspiracist ideation is associated with
paranormal and superstitious beliefs, and lower crystallized intel-
ligence (Swami et al., 2011), although these associations tend to
be relatively weak.
Although this work has been important in shaping contem-
porary understandings of conspiracy theories, an important gap
in the literature concerns the stability of conspiracy theorizing
over time. For example, although conspiracy theories in general
remain popular (Swami and Furnham, 2013), individual conspir-
acy theories may vary across a number of dimensions, such as
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their prominence in the public sphere and their longevity. Indeed,
almost all psychological studies on conspiracy theories to date
have focused on constrained periods of time, taking a snapshot of
particular conspiracy theorizing at a given point. Although cross-
sectional studies have been useful, there is a need to supplement
the existing database with longitudinal studies (Uscinski et al.,
2011).
Certainly, there is some evidence that broad socio-political
factors influence when and where conspiracy theories become
viable modes of explanation. In their longitudinal assessment of
published letters to the editor of the New York Times from 1897
to 2010, Uscinski et al. (2011) reported that international and
domestic conflicts influenced when and how conspiracy theories
became more prominent in the United States. More specifically,
they found that conspiracy theories were more frequent and
vociferous during times of elections and wars. Even so, systematic
longitudinal work on conspiracy theories remains in its infancy
and further prospective work may highlight important dimen-
sions of conspiracy theorizing that have hitherto been neglected
(Uscinski et al., 2011).
For example, while the extant literature has focused on stable
individual differences that correlate with conspiracy theorizing,
it is also possible that change (or lack of change) can occur
at the level of specific beliefs. Such change might relate to a
number of different aspects, including the strength, dimension-
ality, content, and correlates of conspiracist beliefs. For example,
changes in the strength of belief in conspiracy theories may be
related to contextual factors, such as the availability of conspir-
acist ideation concerning a given event (e.g., in terms of media
exposure; cf. Swami et al., 2010). By contrast, stability in belief in
a conspiracy theory may be a function of the monological nature
of conspiracy theories (Goertzel, 1994) or the fact that conspir-
acy theories are predicted by a set of relatively stable individual
difference traits (Swami and Coles, 2010; Swami and Furnham,
2013). Understanding if and when such changes occur, therefore,
remains an important task for scholars.
As a contribution to the literature, then, the present study uti-
lized a repeated cross-sectional survey design to examine belief
in a specific conspiracy theory in Austria, namely what we refer
to broadly as conspiracy theories concerning the kidnapping
of Natascha Kampusch, an Austrian woman. Kampusch was
abducted at age 10 by Wolfgang Priklopil and held captive for
more than 8 years until her eventual escape in August 2006. Media
attention of Kampusch has remained in the public sphere, with
Kampusch giving select interviews, hosting her own talk show
in mid-2008, and publishing an autobiography in September
2010. Beginning in 2006, conspiracy theories of the Kampusch
kidnapping have circulated, mainly on the Internet, with var-
ious strands including the suggestion that there were multiple
perpetrators of her abduction and that investigators covered up
evidence.
Conspiracy theories of the Kampusch kidnapping were
selected as the focus of the present study as it provides a useful
snapshot of a relatively localized narrative of an event of national
significance in Austria. Here, we report on data obtained at two
time points—October 2009 and October 2011 (selected as mat-
ter of convenience)—and drawn from independent cross-sections
of the Austrian population. The two time points represent peri-
ods when it is thought that Kampusch conspiracy theories had
reached saturation in Austria. Although repeated cross-sectional
evidence is considered to be inferior to true longitudinal evidence
or panel data (that is, data from the same cross-sectional units
over time), this nevertheless provides more information than data
from a single cross-sectional survey and avoids known problems
of sample attrition and response bias (Moffit, 1993; Verbeek and
Vella, 2005). Given the lack of previous longitudinal work, this
part of the study was largely exploratory.
In addition, we also examined the influence of individual
difference factors known to shape conspiracist ideation (i.e.,
general conspiracist ideation, self-esteem, paranormal and super-
stitious beliefs, crystallized intelligence, and media exposure)
on belief in the Kampusch conspiracy theories at both time
points. Specifically, and based on previous work, we expected
that belief in the Kampusch conspiracy theory would be associ-
ated with greater general conspiracist ideation, lower self-esteem,
greater paranormal and superstitious beliefs, lower intelligence,
and greater media exposure at both time points.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Time Point 1
Participants in the first testing period were 169 women and 112
men recruited from among the general population in Austria.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 80 years (M = 33.83, SD =
15.44). All participants were of European Caucasian descent
and, in terms of educational qualifications, 5.4% had completed
minimum secondary education, 24.2% had completed an appren-
ticeship, 55.4% had a college diploma, 14.6% had a university
degree, and the remainder had some other qualification.
Time Point 2
At the second testing period, the participants were 184 women
and 89 men (age range 16–60 years, M = 25.97, SD = 8.54). All
participants were of European Caucasian ancestry and 2.6% had
completed minimum secondary schooling, 6.2% had an appren-
ticeship, 70.8% had a college diploma, 20.4% had a university
degree, and the remainder had some other qualification.
MATERIALS
Conspiracist beliefs about Natascha Kampusch
To measure conspiracist beliefs about the kidnapping of Natascha
Kampusch, we purpose-designed a novel 12-item scale using stan-
dard scale-development procedures (Spector, 1992). Authors SS,
NG, and MV initially reviewed the available conspiracist liter-
ature about the kidnapping of Natascha Kampusch. Based on
this review, each author generated items independently, which
were then discussed in a group session until consensus was
reached. This process led to the final version of the Kampusch
Conspiracy Scale (KCS), with items reflecting aspects of con-
spiracist theorizing about the kidnapping and aftermath. The 12
items on this scale, which were rated on a 9-point Likert-type
scale (1 = Completely false, 9 = Completely true), are presented
in Table 1. The factor structure and reliability of this scale is
explored in the Results section.
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Table 1 | Items in the Kampusch conspiracy scale and factor loadings following exploratory factor analysis.
Items Time Point 1 Time Point 2
(1) The mother of Natascha Kampusch—Mrs. Brigitta Sirny—and Wolfgang Priklopil knew each other even before
the kidnapping.
0.15 0.29
(2) The fact that Natascha Kampusch was carrying her passport with her at the time of her kidnapping indicates that
her mother knew about the planned kidnapping.
0.33 0.30
(3) It is implausible that Natascha Kampusch did not have an opportunity to flee during her 8-year kidnapping, as
she was allowed to make phone calls and occasional outdoor trips with Priklopil.
−0.04 −0.01
(4) Herwig Haidinger—the former head of the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation—was actively prevented
from seeing witness reports by the state attorney’s office in order to follow-up failures during the investigation.
0.05 0.13
(5) Natascha Kampusch became pregnant by Priklopil during her imprisonment, but hints about this were destroyed. 0.21 0.16
(6) Although the police refute the “multiple-perpetrator-theory” in their reports, the witness report of the
12-year-old friend of Natascha Kampusch, who witnessed the kidnapping, reinforces this hypothesis.
0.60 0.56
(7) The parents of Natascha Kampusch sold her to Wolfgang Priklopil for financial gain. 0.42 0.31
(8) The Federal Office of Justice knowingly protected a child pornography ring during the investigation. 0.60 0.64
(9) The only witness, who stated having seen a second perpetrator in the car used for the kidnapping, was later
forced to revise her testimony.
0.68 0.73
(10) The police paid too little attention to some evidence (e.g., an anonymous phone call), which points to a cover-up. 0.75 0.76
(11) Franz Kröll, the former chief investigator, was hindered by the Federal Office of Justice from investigating the
“multiple-perpetrator-theory” more closely.
0.48 0.42
(12) Franz Kröll, the former chief investigator, was placed under such heavy pressure as a result of his investigations
that he committed suicide in 2010.
0.65 0.78
Values in bold indicate that an item was retained.
Note: items were presented in a random order in the survey.
Conspiracist ideation
To measure general conspiracist ideation, we included the Belief
in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (Swami et al., 2010, 2011;
German translation: Swami et al., 2011), a 15-item measure that
describes a range of internationally-recognizable conspiracy the-
ories (sample item: “A powerful and secretive group, known as
the New World Order, are planning to eventually rule the world
through an autonomous world government, which would replace
sovereign governments”). All items were rated on a 9-point
Likert-type scale (1 = Completely false, 9 = Completely true) and
an overall score was computed as the mean of all items (higher
scores reflect greater belief in conspiracy theories). Previous work
has shown that the scale is one-dimensional and its item pool
has good internal consistency (Swami et al., 2010, 2011) and
correlates strongly with scores from a non-event based, generic
measure of conspiracist ideation (r = 0.88; Brotherton et al.,
2012). In the present work, Cronbach’s α for this scale was 0.87
at both time points.
Self-esteem
We measured self-esteem using Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem
Scale (Rosenberg, 1965; German translation: von Collani
and Herzberg, 2003), a 10-item measure of an individual’s
self-worth (sample item: “On the whole, I am satisfied with
myself”). All items were rated on a 4-point Likert-type scale
(1 = Strongly disagree, 4 = Strongly agree) and an overall score
was computed by taking the mean of all items following reverse-
coding of five items (higher scores reflect higher self-esteem).
The scale has been shown to have a one-dimensional factor struc-
ture and good psychometric properties (e.g., Whiteside-Mansell
and Corwyn, 2003). Cronbach’s α for this measure was 0.77 at
Time Point 1 and 0.87 at Time Point 2.
Paranormal beliefs
To measure paranormal beliefs and experiences, we used the
Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS; Lange and Thalbourne,
2002; German translation: Voracek, 2009). In this 18-item scale,
“sheep” refer to those who believe in the possibility of paranormal
phenomena and “goats” refer to disbelievers of such phenomena
(sample item: “I have had at least one experience of telepa-
thy between myself and another person”). In its original form,
the ASGS uses a visual analogue system for responses (Lange
and Thalbourne, 2002). This response scale was modified to a
6-point Likert-type scale (0 = Totally disagree, 5 = Totally agree)
by Voracek (2009), which was also the response format used
in the present study. The scale is sometimes argued to con-
sist of three subscales (relating to extrasensory perception, psy-
chokinesis, and belief in the afterlife), but each of the sub-
scales are highly inter-correlated and the preferred scoring has
been to calculate an overall score as the mean of all items
(for a discussion, see Voracek, 2009; higher scores on this scale
reflect stronger belief in paranormal phenomena). Cronbach’s
α for the ASGS in the present study was 0.94 at Time Point 1
and 0.92 at Time Point 2, which is similar to values reported
with previous use of the scale (Voracek, 2009; Swami et al.,
2011).
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Superstitious beliefs
Superstitious beliefs were measured using the 6-item
Superstitious Beliefs Scale developed by Wiseman and Watt
(2004; German translation: Voracek, 2009). The scale measures
agreement with both negative (e.g., walking under a ladder)
and positive (e.g., touching wood) superstitions on a 6-point
Likert-type scale (0 = Totally disagree, 5 = Totally agree).
Although separate scores can be calculated for negative and
positive superstitious beliefs, Voracek (2009) recommended
considering the scale one-dimensional and computing an overall
superstitious beliefs score by taking the mean of all six items
(higher scores on this scale reflect stronger superstitious beliefs).
Cronbach’s α for this scale was 0.86 at Time Point 1 and 0.79 at
Time Point 2, which is similar to previous reports of the scale’s
internal consistency (Voracek, 2009; Swami et al., 2011).
Crystallized intelligence
To measure crystallized (general) intelligence, we included the
Wortschatztest (WST) or German Vocabulary Test (Metzler and
Schmidt, 1992; Schmidt and Metzler, 1992). This is a multiple-
choice vocabulary test that comprises 42 items, each of which
consists of one target word, interspersed among five made-up
words (i.e., neologisms) as distractors. An overall score on the
test consists of the sum of correctly answered items. The WST
is often used for estimating cognitive functioning and is a good
proxy for crystallized intelligence among German-speaking sam-
ples (Pietschnig et al., 2010). Furthermore, scores on the test cor-
relate well with other measures of cognitive ability (e.g., Merten,
2005).
Media exposure
After Swami et al. (2010), we included a measure of exposure to
conspiracist ideas about the kidnapping of Natascha Kampusch
and the aftermath of the case. Participants rated the extent to
which five items were true of themselves on a 9-point Likert-type
scale (1 = Completely false, 9 = Completely true). The five items
related to the extent to which participants had sought information
about the Kampusch case from five distinct sources (the Internet,
films or television programs, books or articles, friends or peers,
and family members). Cronbach’s α for the total scale was 0.59
at Time Point 1 and 0.57 at Time Point 2. However, item-total
correlations were lower for the Internet (rit = 0.28) and books
or articles (rit ≤ 0.17) than for the other three sources (rit rang-
ing between 0.31 and 0.59). Cronbach’s α for the scale without the
Internet and books or articles was 0.65 at Time Point 1 and 0.64 at
Time Point 2. Thus, for analysis, we used scores of the three-item
scale and the individual scores of the two remaining items.
Demographics
Participants provided their demographic details consisting of age,
sex, ethnicity, and highest educational qualification.
PROCEDURE
Data collection was conducted using a snowball sampling tech-
nique. Specifically, several data collectors from the University of
Vienna initiated sampling through their personal contacts, who in
turn were requested to recruit further participants from their own
networks. Potential participants were invited to complete a sur-
vey on their social and political opinions. The first testing period
took place in October 2009 and the second testing period took
place 2 years later in October 2011. Participants from both time
points completed an identical survey in which the components
of the survey were semi-randomized. All participants took part
on a voluntary basis, were not remunerated for participation, and
were provided with a debrief sheet once they had completed the
survey.
RESULTS
DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS OF CONSPIRACIST BELIEFS ABOUT
NATASCHA KAMPUSCH
In order to examine the factor structure of the KCS, we computed
principal-axis exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using quartimax
rotation (because of the expectation of the emergence of a general
factor; Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991) using the data from Time
Points 1 and 2 separately. The number of factors to be extracted
was determined by factor eigenvalues (λ) above 1.0 (the EGV1
criterion) and based on the scree-plot criterion (Cattell, 1966).
However, these techniques can lead to factor over-retention (Patil
et al., 2010), so parallel analysis was also conducted. This tech-
nique generates eigenvalues from random datasets that match
the actual dataset in terms of the number of participants and
variables, and is considered a more accurate technique for deter-
mining the number of factors to retain from EFA (Hayton et al.,
2004).
For the data from Time Point 1, Barlett’s test of sphericity,
χ2
(66) = 909.69, p < 0.001, and the KMO measure of sampling
adequacy, KMO = 0.83, showed that the KCS items had ade-
quate common variance for factor analysis. The EGV1 criterion
and examination of the scree-plot suggested it was possible to
extract three factors after six iterations. However, parallel anal-
ysis showed that only the first eigenvalue for the random data set
(2.59) was smaller than its real data counterpart (2.64). By con-
trast, the second and third eigenvalues for the random data set
were larger (2.44 and 1.93) than the second and third eigenval-
ues for the real data (2.39 and 1.82). These results indicate that
only the first factor should be retained. Examination of the item
loadings (see Table 1) indicated that 8 of the 12 items of the KCS
loaded onto the first factor. This factor explained 22.0% of the
variance. Further examination of the inter-correlations between
the first and second factors indicated that these were strongly
correlated (r = 0.69), suggesting substantial overlap in content
coverage.
For the data from Time Point 2, Barlett’s test of sphericity,
χ2
(66) = 1177.34, p < 0.001, and the KMO measure of sampling
adequacy, KMO = 0.88, again showed that the KCS items had
adequate common variance for factor analysis. Based on the
EGV1 criterion and examination of the scree-plot, it appeared
that two factors could be extracted after four iterations. As before,
however, parallel analysis showed that only the first eigenvalue for
the random data set (2.62) was smaller than its real data counter-
part (2.89), whereas the second eigenvalue for the random data
set was larger (2.52) than the second eigenvalues for the real data
(2.51). These results indicate that only the first factor should be
retained. Item loadings (see Table 1) suggested a similar pattern
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of loadings as with the data from Time Point 1, with 8 of the 12
KCS items loading onto the first factor (explaining 24.1% of the
variance). Furthermore, the first and second factors were highly
inter-correlated (r = 0.67), suggesting content overlap between
the two factors.
Based on the above results, we computed an overall score
of conspiracist beliefs about the Natascha Kampusch case by
taking the mean of the eight items that loaded on the first fac-
tor. The scale showed good internal consistency at both Time
Point 1 (α = 0.78) and Time Point 2 (α = 0.83). Analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA; factors: time point and sex; covariate: age)
showed no significant sex differences in KCS scores at both time
points, F(1, 524) = 0.02, p = 0.897, η2p < 0.01, no interaction of
time point with sex, F(1, 524) = 0.22, p = 0.640, η2p < 0.01, and
no effect of age on KCS scores, F(1, 524) = 0.23, p = 0.634, η2p <
0.01. However, there was a nominally significant difference in
the strength of conspiracist beliefs about Kampusch between
Time Point 1 (M = 3.72, SE = 0.09) and Time Point 2 (M =
3.45, SE = 0.10), although the effect size was small, F(1, 524) =
3.98, p = 0.046, η2p = 0.01. Further univariate analyses of vari-
ance (ANOVAs) revealed a significant difference between time
points in self-esteem, although again the effect size was negligible.
There were no other significant differences in included variables
between time points (see Table 2). Notably, however, participants
had sought information about the Kampusch case mostly from
films and television, friends, peers, and family, but generally less
from the Internet and books or articles.
PERSONALITY AND FURTHER CORRELATES OF CONSPIRACIST BELIEFS
ABOUT NATASCHA KAMPUSCH
We next computed bivariate correlations between belief in the
Kampusch conspiracy theory and all remaining variables at Time
Points 1 and 2, respectively. As can be seen in Table 3, at Time
Point 1, stronger belief in the Kampusch conspiracy was sig-
nificantly associated with greater conspiracist ideation, greater
paranormal beliefs, greater superstitious beliefs, lower crystal-
lized intelligence, and greater overall exposure to media about
the Kampusch conspiracy, excluding, however, exposure to the
Internet. The same pattern was replicated at Time Point 2, with
the exception of the association between belief in the Kampusch
conspiracy theory and crystallized intelligence, which no longer
reached significance. In contrast to Time Point 1, greater belief
in the Kampusch conspiracy correlated with greater exposure to
the Internet at Time Point 2 but ceased to correlate with expo-
sure to books or articles. Moreover, having sought information
from books or articles was negatively correlated with self-esteem
at Time Point 1 but not at Time Point 2.
We also computed a multiple linear regression model with
belief in the Kampusch conspiracy as the criterion variable
and time point, sex and age, and all other remaining variables
Table 2 | Univariate analyses of variance for all dependent variables with time point as the independent variable.
Time Point 1 Time Point 2 F P η2p
M SD M SD
Conspiracist ideation 3.88 1.44 3.83 1.37 0.14 0.709 <0.01
Self-esteem 3.46 0.43 3.34 0.52 8.53 0.004 0.02
Paranormal beliefs 2.47 1.10 2.38 0.98 1.03 0.311 <0.01
Superstitious beliefs 1.89 1.05 1.94 0.97 0.40 0.527 <0.01
Crystallized intelligence 31.05 5.52 30.90 5.81 0.09 0.765 <0.01
Media exposure to Kampusch conspiracies
Films or television programs, friends or peers, and family members 5.94 2.08 5.80 1.94 0.65 0.420 <0.01
Internet 1.96 2.15 2.22 2.24 1.87 0.172 <0.01
Books or articles 1.27 1.00 1.30 1.21 0.12 0.731 <0.01
Table 3 | Inter-scale bivariate correlations between belief in the Kampusch conspiracy theory and all remaining variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Belief in Kampusch conspiracy 0.56** −0.11 0.32** 0.14* −0.12* 0.21** 0.03 0.18**
(2) Conspiracist ideation 0.59** −0.12* 0.37** 0.12* −0.19* 0.14* 0.06 0.12
(3) Self-esteem −0.06 −0.10 0.05 −0.07 0.05 0.03 −0.08 −0.28**
(4) Paranormal beliefs 0.28** 0.49** −0.04 0.26** −0.23** 0.11 −0.08 −0.01
(5) Superstitious beliefs 0.20** 0.21** 0.07 0.37** −0.19* 0.28** 0.08 0.10
(6) Crystallized intelligence −0.07 −0.18* −0.03 −0.19* −0.21** −0.09 0.11 −0.05
(7) Media exposure 0.23** 0.24** −0.01 0.19** 0.27** −0.16* 0.25** 0.01
(8) Internet 0.16* 0.12 −0.09 0.04 0.03 −0.08 0.18** 0.22**
(9) Books or articles 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12* 0.08 −0.02 0.15* 0.13*
Note: *p < 0.01, **p < 0.001. Time Point 1 = above diagonal, Time Point 2 = below diagonal.
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entered simultaneously as predictors. Furthermore, we also added
interaction terms of time point with each predictor to the
regression model to account for possible differences between
time points. The regression model was significant, F(21, 504) =
15.43, p < 0.001, Adj. R2 = 0.37, with conspiracist ideation (B =
0.48, SE = 0.05, β = 0.47, t = 9.01, p < 0.001), media expo-
sure (three-item scale; B = 0.09, SE = 0.04, β = 0.13, t = 2.59,
p = 0.010), exposure to books or articles (B = 0.18, SE = 0.07,
β = 0.14, t = 2.48, p = 0.014), and paranormal beliefs (B =
0.15, SE = 0.07, β = 0.11, t = 2.15, p = 0.032) emerging as sig-
nificant predictors. Notably, interactions of exposure to books
or articles with time point (B = −0.29, SE = 0.10, β = −0.21,
t = −2.95, p = 0.003) and of exposure to the Internet with
time point (B = 0.12, SE = 0.05, β = 0.15, t = 2.35, p = 0.019)
also turned out significant. I.e., exposure to books or arti-
cles lost its predictive value at Time Point 2, whereas expo-
sure to the Internet gained predictive value at Time Point 2.
None of the other predictors or interactions were significant
(ps ≥ 0.098).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we examined the temporal stability of
belief in conspiracy theories concerning the kidnapping case
of Natascha Kampusch. Our results indicated, firstly that those
beliefs could be reduced to a single dimension that reflected a
general conspiracist point of view concerning the Kampusch case.
It is worth noting that, although our measure included a num-
ber of disparate claims (e.g., that Kampusch’s parents sold her
into captivity and that investigators were covering up evidence
of multiple perpetrators), it was apparent from our factor analy-
sis that the items in our measure reduced to a single dimension
at both time points. This suggests that conspiracist ideas sur-
rounding the Kampusch case can best be considered as generally
one-dimensional.
In addition, we examined the temporal stability of those con-
spiracist ideas across a 2-year period beginning in October 2009.
The first thing to note is that mean scores at both time points were
below the mid-point of the scale, thus suggesting relatively low-
level agreement with the items was typical. Moreover, the strength
of those beliefs remained relatively stable over the period of exam-
ination. Although there was a significant decline in the strength of
belief in the conspiracy theory between Time Points 1 and 2, the
effect size of the difference was very small and therefore of lit-
tle practical significance. This is in tandem with our finding that
the strength of belief in general conspiracy theories did not differ
significantly over testing periods.
Both Gray (2008) and Swami (2012) have argued that,
when examining particular conspiracy theories within a spe-
cific national context, it will be important to consider the way
in which local socio-political, economic, and cultural factors
affect conspiracist ideation. Here, using a repeated cross-sectional
design, we were able to show that belief in a conspiracy the-
ory relatively unique to Austria remained stable over a period
of 2 years. Although we cannot conclusively link this with sta-
bility in the wider Austrian context during the same period, it
seems likely that conspiracy theories concerning the Kampusch
case reached saturation by 2009 and that belief in those theories
has remained relatively stable since, albeit at a generally low
level.
Consistent with previous work (Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al.,
2010, 2011; Swami and Furnham, 2012; Wood et al., 2012), our
results also showed that belief in the Kampusch conspiracy theory
at both time points was significantly predicted by a general con-
spiracist worldview, or belief in other conspiracy theories. This
is consistent with the suggestion that conspiracy theories form
part of a monological belief system, wherein a conspiracist world-
view eases the assimilation of new conspiracy theories (Goertzel,
1994). In this way, conspiracy theorists are able to assimilate
explanations for novel phenomena and events that may other-
wise be difficult to understand or that would threaten prevailing
worldviews.
Our results also showed that belief in the Kampusch conspir-
acy theory was relatively weakly but significantly associated with
media exposure to the conspiracy at both time points. Moreover,
we obtained evidence of changing effects with regard to specific
sources of information over time even though media exposure
itself remained stable. Effects of films or television programs, of
friends or peers, and of family remained stable over time, suggest-
ing a stable role of these sources with regard to the formation and
maintenance of belief in the Kampusch conspiracy. However, we
observed a switch in the effects of print media and the Internet.
Print media fuelled belief in the Kampusch conspiracy at Time
Point 1 but not Time Point 2, whereas the Internet had no influ-
ence on the belief at Time Point 1 but gained influence at Time
Point 2. These findings suggest that the dissemination of infor-
mation sustaining the Kampusch conspiracymay have declined in
print media between 2009 and 2011. Conversely, the circulation of
conspiracy theories on the Kampusch kidnapping on the Internet
appears to have increased by 2011. However, importantly, these
changes did neither increase nor decrease overall levels of belief in
the Kampusch conspiracy between 2009 and 2011. This corrobo-
rates again that conspiracy theories may be part of a monological
belief system. Finally, of note and with the exception of paranor-
mal beliefs in Time 1, none of the other variables included in our
study emerged as significant predictors of belief in the Kampusch
conspiracy.
The main limitation of the present study concerns the use
of a repeated cross-sectional design. Although this method has
its advantages (Moffit, 1993; Verbeek and Vella, 2005), it limits
the conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of the existing
dataset. For example, although it is possible to use a repeated
cross-sectional design to examine the extent to which belief
in a particular conspiracy theory changed between two time
points, to assess whether a person who subscribed to the con-
spiracy theory at Time Point 1 is more or less likely to believe
in the theory at Time Point 2 requires the use of true longi-
tudinal data. A longitudinal design also has other benefits over
a repeated cross-sectional design, including increased statistical
power and the potential to estimate a greater range of conditional
probabilities.
In a similar vein, it is possible that differences in the cross-
section of participants in each time point affected the nature of
our results. That is, it is not possible to say that the samples
recruited at either time point were representative of the wider
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Austrian population, thus limiting the generalizability of our
findings. Furthermore, the use a snowball sampling technique
likely resulted in a biased sample. For instance, participants
who had been debriefed about the study may have selectively
recruited other participants. It is therefore not possible to estab-
lish with certainty the background level of conspiracist belief,
although any bias will likely have been preserved across sampling
periods.
Other limitations of our work include the relatively small
sample sizes at each time point and the limited number of addi-
tional variables included in our design. In terms of the latter in
particular, we did not include any variables that might predict
change in conspiracist beliefs, which should be considered in
future work. Nevertheless, the present work begins the important
task of examining the temporal stability of conspiracy theories
over time. The use of true longitudinal datasets will undoubtedly
assist scholars in this area of research to understand the nature
of conspiracy theories in greater detail. Highlighting points at
which specific conspiracy theories change and/or become rel-
atively stable within a given population may assist scholars in
understanding the transmission of conspiracy theories within a
given population.
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